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ABSTRACT
Background: The illicit tobacco trade results in huge
losses of revenue to governments, estimated at $US40–
50 billion in 2006, and in increased consumption and thus
health problems because it makes tobacco available more
cheaply. On 20 October 2008 the second meeting of the
International Negotiating Body (INB2) on the illicit trade
protocol of WHO’s Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control (FCTC) will discuss measures to tackle the illicit
trade in tobacco products.
Methods: This paper presents the experience over the
last decade of three countries, Italy, Spain and the United
Kingdom, which shows that tobacco smuggling can be
successfully tackled.
Conclusion: The evidence strongly suggests that the key
to controlling smuggling is controlling the supply chain,
and that the supply chain is controlled to a great extent by
the tobacco industry.
The illicit tobacco trade results in huge losses of
revenue to governments, estimated at approxi-
mately $US40–50 billion in 2006,
1 and in increased
consumption and thus health problems, because it
makes tobacco available more cheaply.
2 In February
2008 negotiations started on a protocol to the
World Health Organization Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC),
2 to
prevent illicit trade in tobacco products, and the
second meeting of the International Negotiating
Body on the Protocol (INB2) starts on 20 October
2008 in Geneva. Article 15 of the FCTC states that
the convention should deal with all forms of illicit
trade in tobacco products, including smuggling,
illicit manufacturing and counterfeiting.
Evidence of the direct and indirect involvement
of the tobacco industry in this large-scale fraud has
become increasingly clear in recent years, on the
basis of internal documents,
3–6 their own admis-
sion
7 and court judgments.
8 In 2000 the deputy
chairman of British American Tobacco, a former
British minister of health, admitted: ‘‘Where any
government is unwilling to act or their efforts are
unsuccessful, we act, completely within the law,
on the basis that our brands will be available
alongside those of our competitors in the smuggled
as well as the legitimate market.’’
7 In 2000 we
explained that the key to smuggling in Canada
‘‘was the export by Canadian manufacturers of
Canadian cigarettes to New York State (where
there is no market for them as US smokers mainly
smoke US brands), from where they were
smuggled back into Canada. At the very least,
the tobacco industry could be said to have
facilitated the smuggling by supplying the cigar-
ettes.’’
9 In July 2008 in Canada two tobacco
companies pleaded guilty and admitted ‘‘aiding
persons to sell or be in possession of tobacco
products manufactured in Canada that were not
packaged and were not stamped in conformity
with the Excise Act’’ between 1989 and 1994.
8 The
criminal fines and civil settlements will result in
the companies paying $C1.15 billion, the largest
ever levied in Canada.
10
In this paper, in which we focus on large-scale
organised smuggling,
11 we describe the cigarette
export practices which targeted the illegal market
in the United Kingdom, Spain and Italy, and show
how substantial reductions in smuggling were
achieved over the last decade.
REDUCING CIGARETTE SMUGGLING IN THE UK,
ITALY AND SPAIN
In 2002 we explained that the heart of cigarette
smuggling is large-scale fraud: containers of cigar-
ettes are exported, legally and duty unpaid, to
countries where they have no market, and where
they disappear into the contraband market.
12 In
this paper we describe how in the United Kingdom,
Spain and Italy, over approximately the last
decade, cigarette smuggling fell from around 15%
to 1–2% in Spain and Italy
13 and from around 21%
to 13% in the United Kingdom.
14 15
United Kingdom
Tobacco smuggling became a serious problem in
the United Kingdom about 10 years ago. British
Customs and Excise (Customs) estimated that the
illicit cigarette market increased from 3% in 1996–7
to 21% in 2000–1.
14 16 In 2000–1 and 2001–2 it
totalled about 16 billion cigarettes, half of them
smuggled Regal and Superkings, an Imperial
Tobacco brand.
16
The nature of large-scale organised smuggling is
well illustrated by these two brands. They were
exported in huge quantities to places where the
intended market was ‘‘unclear’’, then were illegally
imported through smuggling networks back into
the United Kingdom. Customs believes that in
2000–1 as many as 65% of the 12 billion Regal and
Superkings exported by Imperial were smuggled
illegally back into the United Kingdom.
16 From
October 2000 to September 2002 a third of all
Regal and Superkings were exported to the
destinations in table 1.
16
These export practices came under scrutiny in
the UK parliament’s Public Accounts Committee
hearings in May and June 2002,
16 when members of
the committee questioned the Imperial Tobacco
chief executive (box 1).
Soon after these hearings, in March 2003,
Customs reported: ‘‘In the past 18 months there
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Superkings exported to destinations outside the EU where
Customs were unclear about the intended market of consump-
tion. In Customs’ previous Memorandum to the Committee
five destinations that accounted for almost a third of Imperial’s
exports (around 3 billion cigarettes) were highlighted: Moldova,
Latvia, Russia (including Kaliningrad), Afghanistan and
Andorra. Since May 2002 exports of Superkings and Regals to
these countries have reduced to only 15 million cigarettes
almost exclusively to Andorra, and three of the destinations
(Moldova, Afghanistan and Latvia) have not received any
Imperial cigarettes at all.’’
17
From 2001–2 to 2002–3 the UK illegal cigarette market share
dropped from 20% to 15%. By 2005–6 the illicit market had
almost halved, from 16 billion cigarettes to 8K billion (fig 1).
18
Regal and Superkings seizures, which represented over one
billion cigarettes in 2000–1 (half of all seizures) were less than
five million in 2006–7, just 1% of seizures of genuine UK
brands.
15 16
In 2000 the UK government also announced an anti-
smuggling action plan, which included scanners for container
detection, prominent fiscal marks on packs, increased punish-
ment, more customs officers and a campaign to increase public
awareness,
14 which halted the increase of smuggling in 2000–1
and 2001–2.
Another British government approach to smuggling has been
the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), an unenforceable,
non-binding agreement, which depends for its effectiveness on
goodwill.
19 Perhaps not surprisingly the tobacco companies have
been happy to sign it, Gallaher being the first in April 2002.
However according to UK Customs 690 million Gallaher
cigarettes were seized from 2002 to 2006,
20 with seizures of
Gallaher brands increasing since 2003–4 in spite of the MOU.
21
The smuggling of Gallaher cigarettes into the United Kingdom
is officially estimated to have cost the Treasury more than £1
billion in lost revenue since 2000.
22 Arguably, the weakness of
the MOUs is acknowledged by the UK government introducing
legislation to make measures to combat illicit trade enforceable.
The UK Finance Act 2006 makes it a legal duty for tobacco
manufacturers not to facilitate smuggling and manufacturers
who fail to take sufficient steps to prevent their products being
smuggled into the United Kingdom face fines of up to £5
million.
23
With an illegal market share of 13% in 2005–6 the problem of
cigarette smuggling has not been solved in the United Kingdom,
mainly because of bootlegging and the counterfeit trade.
Bootlegging involves the purchase, by individuals or small
groups, of tobacco products in low tax jurisdictions, in amounts
that exceed customs limits, for resale in high tax jurisdictions.
11
Bootlegging was a minor problem in the past because price
differences of the same brand between countries were smaller.
24
In 2000–1 in the United Kingdom 80% of cigarette smuggling
was large-scale smuggling (container fraud) and 20% boot-
legging.
25 However, large price differences for the same
brands
26 27 have grown even larger in recent years. For example
in 2008 the price of a pack of Marlboro in the United Kingdom
was eight times that in Russia and 12 times that in Ukraine.
28
While large-scale smuggling with genuine brands has decreased,
the proportion of counterfeit cigarettes in the United
Kingdom has increased. According to UK Revenue and
Customs, around a quarter of the smuggled cigarette market
is now counterfeit.
29
Table 1 Destination of Regal and Superkings exports between 2000
and 2002
Country Exports Population in 2002
Latvia 1363 million 2 367 000
Kalingrad (Russia) 934 million 430 000
Afghanistan 325 million 27 756 000
Moldova 576 million 4 435 000
Andorra 84 million 68 000
Box 1 The UK’s Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee
questions Imperial Tobacco’s chief executive, Mike Davis
Committee: … you said you believed you sold to legitimate
consumers in Latvia, and in Latvia you sold 1.7 billion cigarettes
in the year 1999–2000, and then the following year 1.4 billion
cigarettes. Do you know the population of Latvia?
Mr Davis: I do not know the precise figure.
Committee: It is 2.3 million, which means each person, man,
woman and child, including non-smokers, would have had to have
smoked 722 cigarettes, which is 36 packets a year. When you
were selling Regal and Superkings to this market, given it is a
brand mainly sold in the UK, what did you think you were doing?
Who did you think was buying these things and why did you think
they were legitimate?
Mr Davis: I think you should understand that Latvia is a hub
market, so the cigarettes were not just consumed in Latvia but in
other markets in Eastern Europe. So I understand your arithmetic
but the fact remains … .
Committee: What I find puzzling is, if it is a hub market why did it
suddenly completely collapse down to 1,290,000? I said 722
cigarettes per person, that is a drop from 1999 to 2001 from 722
cigarettes per person to half a cigarette per person, that is a fairly
precipitous fall in the market. What happened?
Mr Davis: We discontinued supply.
Committee: Why?
Mr Davis: Because product was coming back into the UK. We
made efforts to identify how that was happening and we could
not guarantee that we would conform to our supply policy
because product was coming back, so we ceased supply.
Committee: So you chose Afghanistan, the source of 98% of the
world’s heroin; you chose Moldova, the largest source of human
prostitution in terms of women being smuggled into Western
Europe; you chose Kaliningrad, which is notorious as a crime-ridden
enclave of the former Soviet Union and is notorious as being run by
criminal gangsters. You chose some pretty odd locations.
One comes to the conclusion that you are either crooks or you are
stupid, and you do not look very stupid. How can you possibly
have sold cigarettes to Latvia, Kaliningrad, Afghanistan and
Moldova in the expectation that those were just going to be used
by the indigenous population or exported legitimately to
neighbouring countries, and not in the expectation they would
be smuggled? You must know—you only have to read a
newspaper every day, a member of the public could tell you—
these are places which are linked to organised crime, that the
drugs trade passes through all of these countries, that prostitution
passes through all these countries. Did you not know that?
Source: This transcript is from the minutes of evidence of the
House of Commons Public Accounts Committee, first published 2
December 2002. Parliamentary material is reproduced with the
permission of the controller of HMSO on behalf of Parliament. Full
transcript
16[ is at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
cm200203/cmselect/cmpubacc/143/2061901.htm
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Italy was one of the first European countries to experience a
serious cigarette smuggling problem. It was concentrated
mainly in some southern provinces where, in the second half
of the 1980s, criminal organisations started smuggling, in
Campania (particularly Naples) and Puglia (particularly Bari
and Brindisi), where they took advantage of access to the
Adriatic Sea.
30–32
Sales of smuggled cigarettes in Italy were estimated at 1.5
million kg in 1985, 8.4 million kg in 1992 and 17 million kg in
1998, when smuggling peaked.
30 31 The smuggling involved
primarily American manufactured cigarettes, especially
Marlboro,
32–36 and its modus operandi is summarised in box
2.
30 31 33–37
In 1992 the Italian authorities banned the sales of Marlboro
because they believed that Phillip Morris (PMI) was complicit in
their smuggling.
35 However the ban was lifted because of
insufficient evidence, and later that year the government and
PMI signed an MOU intended to prevent the smuggling.
31 This
MOU was strongly criticised in a 2000 Parliamentary committee
report which said that it only created ‘‘an illusion of good
collaboration’’.
31
By 1998 European governments and European Community
(EC) officials believed that the manufacturers were selling
American cigarettes to traders who resold them into black
markets set up to evade foreign taxes, and had begun
investigations.
38 In November 2000 in New York, the EC filed
a civil action against Phillip Morris and RJ Reynolds, accusing
the companies of ‘‘an ongoing global scheme to smuggle
cigarettes, launder the proceeds of narcotics trafficking, obstruct
government oversight of the tobacco industry, fix prices, bribe
foreign public officials, and conduct illegal trade with terrorist
groups and state sponsors of terrorism.’’.
33 In 2001 ten EU
countries, led by Italy,
39 joined the lawsuit.
In 2004 the EC and member states dropped the case against
Phillip Morris in return for an enforceable and legally binding
agreement (which did not constitute an admission of liability by
PMI).
40 41 Under the agreement PMI agreed to pay the EC $1
billion over 12 years.
40 PMI also had to make substantial
additional payments if smuggled PMI cigarettes continued to be
seized by the authorities. The agreement also required PMI to
control future smuggling through a range of measures, which
included controlling the distribution system and contractors
supplied, and tracking and tracing measures. In order to
effectively combat illicit trade in tobacco products, law
enforcement authorities need to be able to monitor the
movement of lawfully manufactured tobacco products as they
travel through the supply chain, and re-create the route taken
by lawfully manufactured tobacco products that they have
seized.
42 PMI, for instance, marks master cases (containing
10 000 cigarettes) with unique, machine scannable barcode
labels before selling to a first purchaser (see box 2). Since 2004
PMI has marked 200 million master cases containing 2000
billion cigarettes with such a unique code. Currently the labels
are limited to the master cases but under the agreement ‘‘PMI
shall maintain an ongoing program of research and development
concerning methods and technologies for improving Carton and
Pack Coding technologies.’’ In 2008 PMI is gradually introdu-
cing the tracking of the cartons in smuggling sensitive markets,
such as Russia and Ukraine. At pack level PMI is experimenting
and applying unique codes on the individual packs in the
German and Peruvian market (the information on the PMI
tracking and tracing system was collected during a visit,
organised by the European Anti Fraud Office (OLAF) on 8
July 2008 in Neufchatel, Switzerland).
From the late 1990s onwards there was a striking fall in
seizures, and legal sales—which fell from the mid 1980s to the
beginning of the 1990s then were stable from 1991 to 1997 at
around 89 000 tonnes per year—rose to just under 103 000
tonnes in 2002 (one tonne is about one million cigarettes) (fig 2).
The volume of seized cigarettes, reflecting the amount of
smuggling, was a mirror image of legal sales, decreasing from
1700 tonnes in 1998 to just 333 tonnes in 2002.
43 Over this
period American manufacturers changed their export practices
such that cigarette exports from the United States to the port of
Antwerp fell from 49 billion in 1997 to three billion in 2001,
44
Figure 1 Percentage of UK cigarette market that is illegal. Source:
Figure is based on data from Tackling Tobacco Smuggling (2000)
14 and
HM Revenue and Customs Departmental Autumn Performance report
(2007).
15
Box 2 Steps in smuggling American cigarette brands into
Italy
1. The cigarettes are manufactured in the United States
2. A first purchaser places an order with manufacturer
3. The containers are exported to the ports of Antwerp in
Belgium, under the ‘‘transit’’ regime, which allows the
temporary suspension of taxes on goods destined for a third
country
4. The containers are exported and imported through many
different locations over a short period of time, the objective
being to obscure the tracking of the goods and to make it
extremely difficult to identify the real owner
5. Payments are often made in cash or from tax havens or
countries with secretive banking laws, such as
Liechtenstein or Switzerland
6. The containers are then transferred from the legal transit
regime to the illegal domain, in a location known for its lack
of surveillance, for example the warehouses in the
Montenegrin ports of Zelenka, Bar and Katar
7. Cases of cigarettes are transferred to speed boats and
shipped at night across the Adriatic to Italy, about 100 miles
away
8. The cigarettes are sold in the streets of Naples and Bari,
often by immigrants
Sources: references 30, 31, 33–37.
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2% in 2006.
13
Data on legal sales of foreign cigarettes in Campania and
Puglia show a large increase from 1998 to 2000, reflecting how
illicit foreign cigarettes became unavailable over that period,
obliging smokers to buy legal foreign cigarettes. Over this period
legal foreign cigarette sales increased 121% in Campania, 55% in
Puglia and 19% in the whole of Italy (table 2) (Lorenzo
Spizzichino, Italian Institute for Statistics (ISTAT), Italian
Ministry of Health, 8 April 2008, personal communication).
Spain
From 1993–1996 to 1996–2000 the resources Spain invested in
combating cigarette smuggling rose from J4 million to almost
J40 million.
47 Over this period the market share of smuggled
cigarettes decreased from 16% to 2% and cigarette tax revenue
rose from J2300 million to J5200 million
45 (fig 3). An
investment of J44 million led to an increase in revenue of
almost J3000 million.
As with Italy, American brands (in this case mainly RJR’s
Winston) were a key source for the contraband trade,
33 so the
Spanish authorities focused resources on preventing container
smuggling, leading to significant seizures. For example, in 1998
Spain seized a cargo ship which had off-loaded 80 million
smuggled cigarettes supplied by Reynolds. RJR Tobacco
International—based in Switzerland—refused to cooperate with
the investigations, claiming the protection of Swiss secrecy
laws.
33 This case resulted, for the first time, in the EU formally
requesting the help of the US government in combating
smuggling, based on a 1997 US-EC customs mutual assistance
agreement.
38 Evidence obtained by the European Fraud Office
(OLAF) in Greece, Albania and the United States, and the
verification of the origin of the markings of the seized cigarettes,
led to the conviction of the smugglers in Spain in 1998.
46
In addition, to take action against large-scale smuggling,
Spain collaborated with OLAF to prevent cigarettes illegally
entering the country from Gibraltar and Andorra. In Andorra
this included sealing the border and political pressure on the
Andorran government by the EC and member states, which
forced Andorra to pass legislation making it illegal to smuggle
tobacco into neighbouring countries.
47 The Spanish customs
authorities said that their success was not due to controlling
distribution at street level, which is almost impossible, but to
reducing supply into the country at container level, through
intelligence, customs activity and improved national and
European cooperation and technology.
9 All these measures,
including the investigations of US tobacco companies and the
2000 EC lawsuit they led to, resulted in the supply of American
cigarettes into the illegal market in Spain being cut off.
DISCUSSION
Anti-smuggling measures in the United Kingdom included
scanners for container detection, prominent fiscal marks on
packs, increased punishment, more customs officers and
parliamentary hearings that exposed tobacco industry export
practices. Large-scale container fraud fell significantly between
2000–1 and 2005–6. When the industry stopped exporting Regal
and Superkings that were re-imported to the illicit market, there
was a huge fall in customs seizures of these brands coming back
into the country, dramatically illustrating that cutting off the
supply to the illicit market led directly to a fall in smuggling. In
Italy, following Italian and European investigations, which led
to legal action against the tobacco industry, and subsequently
to a binding agreement with Phillip Morris, there was a
dramatic fall in customs seizures and a corresponding rise in
legal sales. Supply of smuggled cigarettes into Spain was
reduced by a combination of measures, including intelligence,
customs activity in border areas and international cooperation,
both within Europe and with US authorities over the supply of
seized US brands.
The OLAF investigation of the tobacco companies in the
United States in 1998 and the Spanish and Italian customs
activities and ensuing lawsuit against American tobacco
companies also appear to have had a significant impact. Over
the period covered by these actions there was a dramatic fall in
US exports to Europe. A plausible interpretation of the data is
that the industry changed its export practices promptly in
response to the investigations. What the investigations and
threat of legal action did was change the risk-benefit equation
for the industry. The prospect of a lawsuit and possible financial
penalties increased the risks of supplying cigarettes that were
reaching the illicit market and reduced the benefits. The changes
in export practices were then reinforced and consolidated by the
formal, legally binding agreement. All three examples have one
common factor: smuggling was reduced by interrupting the
supply chain from the manufacturers to the illicit market. In
Italy and Spain international cooperation was also crucial.
There is little convincing evidence that voluntary measures,
like MOUs, have a useful effect. When they are compared with
the legally binding EC-Phillip Morris agreement, this does not
seem surprising. For example, none of the MOUs stipulated
seizure payments, whereas the EC-Phillip Morris agreement
included such payments. MOUs rely entirely on the goodwill
and willingness of the tobacco manufacturers to cooperate,
Figure 2 Cigarette seizures and legitimate sales in Italy 1986–2002.
Source: figure is based on data from Guardia di Finanza annual reports,
1986 to 2003
43 and Italian Institute for Statistics (2008). (Lorenzo
Spizzichino, Italian Institute for Statistics (ISTAT), Italian Ministryo f
Health, 8 April 2008, personal communication.)
Table 2 Legal sales of foreign cigarettes in Campania,
Puglia and Italy, 1998–2000 (tonnes)
Campania Puglia Italy
1998 3719 3225 59 634
2000 8231 4997 71 216
Source: Lorenzo Spizzichino, Italian Institute for Statistics (ISTAT),
Italian Ministry of Health, 8 April 2008, personal communication.
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not obligatory, and if the companies fail to honour them, there
are no penalties or seizure payments. When, in a recent court
case involving Gallaher, the UK Customs Director General for
Enforcement was asked by the judge about MOUs: ‘‘You have
no lawful power to tell somebody what he may lawfully do?’’
the reply was: ‘‘Absolutely. We had no power.’’
48
Although we have focused in this article on large-scale
organised smuggling, it is only one type of the illicit tobacco
trade and a treaty to combat illicit trade needs to deal with all
its forms. In the United Kingdom, for example, where the illegal
cigarette market remains high, at 13% in 2005–6, bootlegging
and counterfeit still result in cheap products reaching the
market, thus representing a serious health problem.
These data strongly suggest that the key to controlling large-
scale organised tobacco smuggling is cutting off supply to the
illicit market—turning off the tap.
12 The UK experience shows
quite clearly how investigation of one tobacco company, with
the implied threat of legal or punitive action, led directly to a
fall in smuggling. In fact the chief executive himself explained
what happened when asked why there had been a precipitous
fall in one of its ‘‘unclear’’ export markets, Latvia: ‘‘We
discontinued supply.’’ The data from Spain and Italy show
that the industry is able to a great extent to control the supply
chain, so that when it considers that smuggling becomes too
risky, it stops supplying the illicit market, and its brands are no
longer available in those illicit markets.
Thus enforceable measures to control the supply chain should
be at the heart of the FCTC protocol on the illicit tobacco
trade.
42 These measures should facilitate investigations into
smuggling operations and make the industry liable for control-
ling the supply chain. They should introduce measures
including licensing all participants in the tobacco business;
tracking and tracing systems from the points of manufacture to
all points of sale, which would help identify the point of
diversion from the legal to the illicit market; traceable methods
of payment; strict scrutiny procedures in the selection of
contractors during the supply process, ensuring, for example,
that they are all genuine companies with real addresses,
employees, and do not have any criminal record; and serious
financial penalties for infringements. The global scope and
multifaceted nature of the illicit tobacco trade requires a
coordinated international response.
2 The illicit trade protocol
is an invaluable opportunity to address the issue and should
commit FCTC parties to act both domestically and interna-
tionally.
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